Neubert, StefanStefanNeubert2024-10-142024-10-142018https://knowledge.hpi.de/handle/123456789/2449We introduce and analyze the possibilities of a new model for network creation by autonomous selfish agents: Unlike in typical network formation games such as the well-known model of Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03], the final network is not directly shaped by the players of a game. Instead, we design mechanisms that take edge preferences of agents as input for a social choice function and return a network that respects those preferences. In addition, it caters for compliance with global restrictions on the network topology and tries to establish several properties, such as global efficiency, maximizing the individual utility of agents, and building stable networks, especially in comparison to the result of an anarchic network formation. The mechanism also aims to produce Nash equilibria and encourages agents to honestly declare their preferences instead of playing strategically. The mechanism approach is a true superset of both centralized network design and uncoordinated network creation games. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to explore the realm inbetween those extremes.mastersthesis